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ABSTRACT 
 
One way to understand the value of sporting ‘superstars’ is to examine the effect they 
have on match attendances and revenue.  Arguably, the most famous sports star in 
Australia was Sir Donald Bradman, whose batting average has far exceeded that of any 
cricket players.  This paper examines the value of Don Bradman by estimating an 
empirical model of the effect of Bradman on cricket match attendances for Ashes Test 
matches in Australia.  The attendance effect – of over 7,000 additional people each day 
on which he batted – is then used to derive an estimate of the effect on revenue.  We find 
that Bradman generated considerable additional revenue, though the range of the 
estimates is very large.  The Australian Cricket Board, as the monopoly supplier of 
cricket, was able to obtain all the extra proceeds. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Consumer economics, Monopoly, Wages and compensation, Professional 
labour markets and occupations 
JEL Classification numbers: D12, D42, J3, J44. 
 
 v
“As far as Australian crowds were concerned, the real objective was Bradman… [in 
1936/37] it was discovered as a fact that if Bradman was dismissed cheaply in the 
morning, the expected receipts in the afternoon fell by some 2,000 pounds” 
Rosenwater (1978) page 252. 
 
1. Introduction 
It is a consensus that Don Bradman was the shining star of Test cricket, arguably 
even the world’s most exceptional athlete. Cricket lovers tend to be obsessed with records 
of his performances, perhaps because the game lends itself so well to measurement. 
Indeed Bradman’s Test batting average of 99.94 is likely to be cricket’s best known 
single piece of data, familiar enough to have been readily accepted as the Australian 
Broadcasting Commission’s Sydney postal box address (GPO Box 9994). 
This paper concerns the derivation of another statistic related to Bradman: his 
effect on Test crowd sizes and thus the additional revenue accruing to the Australian 
Cricket Board.1 It is important to understand that because of the rules associated with 
player eligibility for Test cricket there was no competitive reason for the monopoly 
supplier to share the rents of a star performer. This meant that none of the direct financial 
rewards were then delivered to players, a point explained further below. 
There are other exercises of this broad kind with respect to overseas sporting 
stars, and there have also been two empirical investigations of the determinants of 
Australian Test cricket crowds, including the effect of Bradman’s presence. In what 
follows we both replicate and extend the latter analyses by converting the estimates of 
additional daily attendance at Tests into approximations of the value of the revenue 
benefits to the ACB. These are derived under a range of alternative assumptions 
concerning interpretations of both levels and investment returns to these additional 
revenues. 
We find that Don Bradman delivered considerable financial profits to Australian 
cricket, but that the range of the derived estimates is very broad. With respect to the 
latter, it is critical to highlight the role played in financial calculation scenarios of the 
value over time of revenue obtained at a particular point in time.  
 
                                                 
1 Known at the time of Bradman’s active participation in Tests as the “Board of Control”. 
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2. The economics of ‘sporting stars’: the literature and Don Bradman’s institutional 
context
2.1 Conceptual issues 
Like most areas of economic analysis, studies of the economic effects of sporting-
stars encompass both theoretical and applied analysis. The seminal theoretical piece in 
this area is Rosen (1981), in which a model is derived in order to explain why the most 
talented people in many fields (not just sports) appear to obtain a disproportionate share 
of the financial returns. It is argued that there are two main reasons for this observed 
“superstar” effect.2  
First, there is imperfect substitution among participants,3 in simple terms “lesser 
talent often is a poor substitute for greater talent”.4 Second, there is the role of the 
production technology: the performance of a sports person is a form of joint consumption 
good. Joint consumption refers to a situation in which the cost of supply is largely 
unrelated to the size of the market. In the case of contemporary sports-stars, the delivery 
technology – large stadiums and TV/radio broadcasting – allows a few outstanding 
performers to supply almost the entire market.   
Important as the Rosen contribution is, much of his analysis is not directly 
relevant to calculations of the direct financial spoils from Don Bradman, which can be 
seen to be the result of the lack of effective competition for players in the Test cricket 
market. That is, the Board of Control (and its English counter-part, the Marylebone 
Cricket Club) had complete jurisdiction over the conditions of Test cricket, and this 
meant that it could capture fully the rents (the profits) from a star player.  
Thus a cricketer with outstanding attraction for the public had no option but to 
play by the rules and accept the rewards offered by his national supplier, since there was 
no international alternative. Even if Bradman had decided to emigrate to England for 
example - as South African Tony Greig did in the 1970s to escape the international 
cricket boycott resulting from apartheid - there was a period of five years before he 
would have been eligible for English selection. Restrictions of this type, in combination 
                                                 
2 Rosen and Sanderson (2001) provide a discussion of these concepts in the contemporary context of labour 
markets in professional sports. 
3 The effect of imperfect substitution also implies an assumption of ‘scarcity’ (Rosen and Sanderson, 2001). 
If there were many top sporting performers, all of a very similar standard, then imperfect substitution with 
respect to talent is of little importance. 
4 According to Rosen (1981), “Imperfect substitution implies convexity in the earnings function: small 
differences in talent become magnified in larger earnings differences, with great magnification if the 
earnings-talent gradient increases sharply near the top of the scale”. 
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with poor remuneration, arguably were highly significant forces in the development of 
World Series Cricket in the 1970s in which most of the Australian Test team defected to 
play with an alternative international competition paying considerably higher salaries. 
Of course, Don Bradman could have refused to play Test cricket. There were at 
least two reasons why he didn’t, both revealed in private correspondence with one of the 
authors after he was sent a draft of Chapman, Fischer and Maloney (1987), showing early 
estimates of his value to the ACB.5 First, he may not have been aware of, or interested in, 
his crowd pulling power, a possibility highlighted by his comment that: “Certainly the 
news that I was worth so much to the ABC reached me 50 years too late”. Second, the 
culture of the game at the time, and his strong nationalism, were such as to imply that no 
extra rewards were expected, as suggested with his remark: “Not that I would ever have 
pursued a professional sporting career – it was always against my instincts. I have no 
objection to professional sportsmen but I don’t think they derive the same pleasure from 
their exertions as the people who play sport primarily for enjoyment.” 
 
2.2 Previous empirical analysis 
This is by no means the first statistical exercise of this type, and in terms of the 
empirical studies of the economic effects of sporting stars two main approaches are used. 
Before outlining these studies, a basic question is, what exactly is a sporting star? 
Essentially, star-status is defined in two ways: selecting individual players using personal 
judgement, a decision presumably influenced by the player’s public profile and history of 
exceptional performances; or by using a more ‘objective’ criterion, such as whether the 
player has won awards or has reached some measurable level of performance.6
The first approach in the estimation of super-star effects is to examine whether 
sports star-status increases individual earnings (eg player salaries). This is usually done 
by estimating a log-linear earnings function, with a subjective measure of star-status as an 
explanatory variable. Empirical studies of this kind have found significant positive 
sports-star effects on individual earnings in the Italian Soccer League (Lucifora and 
Simmons, 2003) and the National Hockey League (Idson and Kahane, 2000). It is worth 
                                                 
5 Written correspondence between Sir Donald Bradman and Bruce Chapman, February 1987. 
6 For example, ‘objective’ superstar measures include: for hockey,  “the number of times a player is 
selected as an all-star  player plus the number of NHL trophies he has won” (Idson and Kahane, 2000); for 
soccer, a career average of “more that 0.4 goals per series A game” (Lucifora and Simmons, 2003). 
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noting that a significant proportion of player earnings, particularly for star players, is 
gained from endorsements, and this is generally not taken into account.7  
As noted above, if the institutional context is such as to mean that players have no 
bargaining power in terms of the distribution of rents from star status, this approach is not 
particularly interesting with respect to measuring the financial returns associated with 
Bradman. This is much less true today, given both that Test cricketers are paid 
differential salaries and have significantly greater economic opportunities with respect to 
commercial endorsements. 
The second empirical approach examines the effect of ‘sporting stars’ on match 
attendance. In this case, a subjective identification of star-status (eg, if the player won 
awards or has reached some measurable level of performance) is made and applied in the 
context of an empirical consumer demand model of match attendances. An approach of 
this kind has been used in a wide variety of sports, including inter alia: the English 
Premier League (Baimbridge et al., 1996); the Malaysian Semi-Pro Football League 
(Wilson and Sim, 1995); British Rugby League (Jones et al., 2000); the National Hockey 
League (Jones and Ferguson, 1988); and one-day cricket series in the U.K. (Schofield, 
1983).8
Two studies involving the U.S. National Basketball Association (NBA) have 
examined the effect of individual sports-stars, and this is the approach we have adopted 
for the Bradman exercise. In the first Berri et al. (2004) found several star basketball 
players had no positive effect on attendances, and in fact, found a significant negative 
effect for one player.9 In the other, Hausman and Leonard (1997) suggest that Michael 
Jordan doubled attendances,10 = and also had a significant positive impact on TV ratings. 
Also, as noted, two previous Australian studies have examined the effect of 
Bradman on Test match attendances, both in the context of more general estimation of 
crowd size determinants. First, and the approach adopted here, is that of Chapman, 
Fischer and Maloney (1987), which examined English-Australian Test crowds from 1920 
to 1969. As well, a study of Test match attendances in Australia by Bhattacharya and 
Smyth (2003) extended the Chapman et al. (1987) approach through the use of more 
                                                 
7 Star basketball player Michael Jordan in the season before retirement received a salary of $3 million per 
season, compared with around $35 million in endorsements. 
8 Additional applications are available in Siegfried and Eisenberg (1980) and Noll (1974)). 
9 The player Grant Hill had a negative effect on crowds, other ‘star’ players included: Shaquille O’Neal, 
Charles Barkley and Michael Jordan. 
10 This paper did not formally model the effect of Michael Jordan on attendances they did, however, 
estimate a regression of the effect of Jordan on TV ratings and found a significant positive effect. 
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years of data (1911 to 1984), somewhat different specifications, and by analysing Test 
matches with non-English oppositions. Comparisons are offered below.  
 
3. Estimation methodology and data 
3.1 Method 
The general theory of consumer demand is an uncontroversial theoretical tool 
available for analysis of the effect of Bradman on Test cricket crowds (and match 
revenue). The demand for Test cricket, defined as daily match attendance, is assumed to 
be a function, inter alia, of population, admittance price, income, the price and 
availability of complements and substitutes, the opportunity cost of attendance, tastes and 
the expected utility of cricket generally and the state of the particularly match 
specifically. Ceteris paribus, the quantity demanded increases with lower admittance 
price, lower prices of complements (such as food and drink sold at the ground), higher 
prices of substitutes (such as radios), lower/high income (depending on whether the good 
is inferior/normal), and with the decreased opportunity cost of time.  
The decision of whether or not to attend Test cricket depends in part on the 
expected quality per unit time of the entertainment. This, presumably, is a function of 
player skill, excitement, opponent, weather, and ground facilities. Obviously, the 
presence of a player of exceptional talent, a super-star such as Don Bradman, increases 
consumers’ utility through the first two variables.  
In summary, these observations imply, in the presence of ideal data, the following 
estimating equation:  
Qd = f(Pop, P, PC, PS, Y, OP, QA) 
where Qd is the quantity demanded of Test cricket, Pop is population, P is the price of 
admittance, PC is the price of complements, PS is the price of substitutes, Y is income, 
OP is the opportunity cost of time and QA is the expected quality of the entertainment. 
Several issues related to the estimation of Test cricket attendances are worthy of 
note. First, a distinctive feature of Test cricket consumption is that the process takes 
considerable time. It is unusual for a game to be concluded in less than four days and, 
before the rules were changed restricting matches to five playing days (in 1960), it was 
not unusual for games to last six or seven playing days. This is important for economic 
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modeling because attention needs to be accorded to the opportunity cost of time 
involved.11
A second issue is that changes in technology, leisure activities and business 
practices over the 50-year period (beginning 1920) are likely to have had a substantial 
effect on cricket crowds, and it is difficult to believe that they can be adequately 
accounted for with existing data. As examples we note the following. One, radio 
broadcasting of matches was not consistent in coverage, neither is the direction of its 
influence obvious in the short term. Two, it was not uncommon in the early part of this 
period for business meetings to be conducted at Test matches, and Cashman (1985) 
reports significant numbers turning up for business negotiations or contacts even though 
play was not possible due to rain. Clearly, these factors are extremely difficult to measure 
or model.  
A final estimation issue concerns the diagnostic testing of the econometric models 
for correct specification and/or function form. The discontinuous occurrence of games 
means that Durbin-Watson and other test statistics for serial correlation are not 
meaningful. However, RESET tests are still useful, and as economic theory offers little 
insight into specification, these are employed to provide guidance as to the robustness of 
the models. 
 
3.2 Data 
Daily data concerning crowd sizes were obtained from Cashman (1985) for 
English-Australian Test matches played in Australia12 in the 1920-69 period,13 
distinguished by whether or not Don Bradman batted on the day in question (which 
happened on 32 occasions after 1930). Figure 1 shows the aggregate data and suggests 
                                                 
11 A previous study of Test cricket demand in the U.K. by Hynds and Smith (1994) captured this 
opportunity cost effect by including a dummy variable for each day of the week; they found that play on 
weekends had a positive and highly significant effect. The only such study for Australia (Bhattacharya and 
Smyth, 2003) modeled average daily attendance of a Test match and did not correct for this opportunity 
cost effect. 
12 Data were also collected for Tests played against West Indies, India, Pakistan, and South Africa (no Tests 
were played against New Zealand or Sri Lanka in this period). The analysis was restricted to English-
Australian Tests because of the difficulty encountered in finding adequate and parsimonious econometric 
models for data pooled across opponents. This implies that crowd determinants, including the effect of 
Bradman batting, differed significantly depending on the team played. 
13 Considerable changes in Australian Cricket took place in the 1970s, including World Series Cricket, one-
day internationals and colour television coverage. These complexities encouraged us to limit the analysis of 
the pre-1970 period, extending the modelling to later years would also appear to add little to an 
examination of the effect of Bradman (for an analysis of Test match attendances over a longer period and 
for a larger range of opposition countries see, Bhattacharya and Smyth [2003])     
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that significantly more people did indeed attend Ashes Tests on days when Bradman 
batted, at least after 1930. 
 
Figure 1 
Average Daily Crowd: Eng. V Aus.
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Obviously, to isolate properly the effect of Don Bradman on crowd sizes (and 
from this, revenue), regression models are necessary, and these need to include as many 
as possible of the broad range of economic and match ‘quality’ variables noted above. 
Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations and brief descriptions of the variables 
used. The economic variables come from Withers et al. (1985), and much of the other 
information was collected through analysis of daily newspaper reports concerning, for 
example, the weather and the state of the game and the series. 
Direct economic variables included were outer ground admission price (PRICE), 
average weekly male earnings (AWE) (entered as a quadratic) and the total 
unemployment rate (UNEMP) (also entered as a quadratic). Variables with some 
economic interpretation were: venue (the Sydney Cricket Ground [SCG]; the Melbourne 
Cricket Ground [MCG]; the Adelaide Oval [AO] and the Brisbane Cricket Ground 
[GABBA], which reflects in part the availability of alternative leisure activities; 
Saturday, Sunday, or public holiday play (SSP), to capture the decreased opportunity 
costs of attendance on such days; and whether or not it rained (RAIN),14 to reflect the 
increased cost per unit of playing time for days in which play was interrupted.15  
                                                 
14 Days where there was no play at all due to rain were excluded entirely. Days where rain affected the 
pitch but not playing time were treated as RAIN equals zero. 
15 We did not test for stationarity with respect to the non-dummy variables. However, Bhattacharya and 
Smyth (2003) did so for their variables, which are the same as we used albeit for a longer period in their 
exercise, and found evidence to support stationarity in all cases.  
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In addition, a host of dummy variables were constructed in an attempt to capture 
the expected quality of the entertainment. There were AWIN and EWIN, set to 1 if 
Australia and England respectively leads the current series, ABAT set equal to 1 if 
Australia batted, FCON set equal to 1 if the result of the game was a foregone conclusion 
on the last day,16 and ASA and ESA set equal to 1 if Australia and England respectively 
had an unbeatable lead at the end of the previous day’s play.17 Additional controls were 
POP, the population in millions of the city where the Test was played, LDAY, a variable 
to indicate the last day’s play, and TIME, the year of the Test. 
 
Table 1 
The Data Described 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Variable description 
Continuous variables: 
CROWD 28,567 17,336 Daily paying crowd 
PRICE* 6.41 1.27 Outer ground admission price 
AWE* 349.80 89.47 Average weekly male earnings 
UNEMP 6.918 6.389 National unemployment rate 
POP 1,040,022 624,187 Population in city of play 
Dummy variables: 
BRAD 0.115 0.319 Bradman batting on day 
BSERIES 0.276 0.448 Series in which Bradman played
McCABE 0.086 0.281 McCabe batting on day 
SCG 0.290 0.455 Sydney Cricket Ground 
MCG 0.330 0.471 Melbourne Cricket Ground 
AO 0.226 0.419 Adelaide Oval 
GABBA 0.154 0.362 Brisbane Cricket Ground 
SSP 0.237 0.426 Saturday, Sunday or public 
holiday 
ABAT 0.742 0.438 Australia batting 
FCON 0.054 0.226 Game a foregone conclusion 
ASA 0.111 0.315 Australia has unbeatable lead on 
previous day 
ASB 0.054 0.226 England has unbeatable lead on 
previous day 
RAIN 0.065 0.246 Play affected by rain 
LASTD 0.190 0.393 Last day of play of the test 
AWIN 0.387 0.488 Australia leading current series 
EWIN 0.269 0.444 England leading current series 
*In 2004 dollars 
 
                                                 
16 Often the last day begins with only a handful of runs or wickets needed by one team to win. The variable 
is set equal to 1 if it is subjectively considered that play is likely to end within the pre-lunch session.  
17 An unbeatable lead is defined as the team batting last requiring for victory greater than 500 runs or fewer 
than 100 runs with all wickets intact. 
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For the purposes of this paper the main quality variable of interest is BRAD, a 
variable set equal to 1 if Bradman batted on the Test day. It should be noted that this 
variable is confined to Bradman’s innings from 1932 until his last Australian Test in 
1947. This is due to the fact that although he made his Test debut in 1928, he did not 
establish his batting reputation until the 1930 tour of England in which he made 904 runs 
at a freakish average of 139.18
A dummy variable, BSERIES, has been included in some specifications to 
identify the series in which Bradman played (from 1930 to 1947), and this has been done 
to capture his potential externalities. In other words, the presence of Bradman in the 
Australian team may have had a ‘spillover effect’ on crowds on days he didn’t bat, and 
even for Tests in the series he didn’t play, by giving cricket a higher public profile. 
Further, for a comparison of the effect of Bradman with that of a more typical star, the 
variable McCABE, is included, set equal to 1 if Stanley McCabe batted. 
 
4. Crowd size regression results 
As the correct functional form of the model is not obvious from theory, linear and 
log-linear models were estimated and subjected to RESET (Ramsey [1969]) tests of 
functional form to gauge their suitability. These results are presented in Appendix 1. On 
the basis of these tests the log-linear form of the model was preferred, the linear model 
exhibiting functional misspecification at the 1 per cent significance level. 
Table 2 reports the OLS coefficients for the log-linear model of daily crowd 
size.19 The full model, Equation 1, incorporates the full set of independent variables, 
including controls for McCABE, and BSERIES to capture the possible externality effect 
of Bradman. Two other regression models are also presented: Equation 2, which excludes 
McCABE, and Equation 3, which excludes both McCABE and BSERIES. 
                                                 
18 Econometric tests of this proposition supported it strongly. 
19 Heteroskedastic robust t-statistics are presented; implemented using the robust errors option in STATA. 
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Table 2 
OLS Estimates of Test Crowd Determinants* 
 Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 
Variable Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
PRICE -0.080 -1.11 -0.082 -1.15 -0.062 -0.99 
AWE -0.002 -0.09 -0.003 -0.15 -0.011 -0.72 
AWE2/1000 -0.010 -0.14 -0.006 -0.09 0.016 0.28 
UNEMP 0.051 1.38 0.054 1.50 0.067 2.25 
UNEMP2 -0.002 -1.52 -0.002 -1.60 -0.002 -2.18 
BRAD 0.228 2.34 0.244 2.82 0.253 2.98 
BSERIES 0.109 0.64 0.102 0.60   
McCABE 0.038 0.34     
SCG 0.745 4.14 0.747 4.16 0.753 4.20 
MCG 1.050 6.88 1.051 6.91 1.048 6.90 
AO 0.694 8.33 0.694 8.34 0.688 8.34 
SSP 0.384 7.46 0.382 7.47 0.383 7.50 
TIME 0.054 0.84 0.058 0.91 0.079 1.48 
TIME2 0.000 -0.44 0.000 -0.49 -0.001 -0.80 
ABAT 0.058 1.09 0.060 1.16 0.057 1.10 
FCON -0.785 -7.24 -0.788 -7.31 -0.790 -7.34 
ASA -0.461 -5.68 -0.459 -5.68 -0.456 -5.66 
ASB -0.350 -3.28 -0.351 -3.30 -0.357 -3.37 
RAIN -0.249 -2.78 -0.246 -2.77 -0.245 -2.76 
LASTD -0.444 -6.55 -0.443 -6.55 -0.444 -6.56 
AWIN -0.235 -3.44 -0.235 -3.46 -0.230 -3.41 
EWIN -0.126 -1.78 -0.128 -1.83 -0.135 -1.94 
POP 0.096 0.7 0.095 0.70 0.091 0.67 
CONSTANT 8.353 12.08 8.366 12.14 8.489 12.92 
Adjusted R2 0.762 0.762 0.763 
Observations = 279 
*Dependent variable = log(daily crowd) 
 
Interpretative estimates of coefficient sizes are presented in Table 3 for significant 
regressors from Equation 3. The table shows the percentage and level change in the 
crowd and level change in (average) gate receipts for a unit increase in dummy variables 
and a 1 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate, calculated at the mean.  The 
final column shows the daily revenues associated with changes in the independent 
variables, calculated by multiplying the number of additional people attending by the 
price of an outer ground ticket, in 2004 dollars. 
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 Table 3 
Interpretative Estimates of Coefficient Sizes 
Variable Percentage 
change in crowd 
Absolute 
change in 
crowd 
Change in average receipts ($2004) 
UNEMP 3.7 1,066 8,397 
BRAD 25.3 7,227 56,952 
SCG+ 75.3 21,511 169,506 
MCG+ 104.8 29,938 235,913 
AO+ 68.8 19,654 154,874 
FCON -79.0 -22,568 -177,835 
ASA -45.6 -13,027 -102,649 
ASB -35.7 -10,198 -80,364 
RAIN -24.5 -6,999 -55,151 
LDAY -44.4 -12,684 -99,948 
AWIN -23.0 -6,570 -51,775 
OWIN -13.5 -3,857 -30,390 
SSP* 38.3 10,941 86,216 
+Compared to the GABBA. 
*Compared to a normal weekday. 
 
With respect to crowd sizes, the most important results of Tables 2 and 3 suggest 
the following.  
 
(i) The direct economic variables are not important in all cases. Neither average 
weekly male earnings20 nor outer ground admittance price were shown to 
significantly affect crowd sizes, although the latter has the expected sign. 
However, increased unemployment increases crowds, but at a decreasing rate 
as unemployment expands.  
(ii) Crowds differ by venue, with the MCG averaging about 30, 36 and 105 per 
cent greater than the SCG, AO and GABBA respectively. This could reflect 
the availability and price of alternative leisure activities, transportation costs, 
ground facilities or even crowd capacities; due to data limitations this last 
possibility is not easily modeled.21 
(iii) Variables that could be interpreted in the light of either opportunity cost or the 
price per unit of time of consumption are very significant. Play on non-
working days attracted additional attendance of 38 per cent, rain decreased the 
                                                 
20 It is prudent to note that the results do not refute the notion that average weekly earnings are relevant in 
terms of crowd determination, it is likely that a high level of collinearity exists between AWE and TIME.  
21There is anecdotal evidence that on occasion crowds actually exceeded so-called capacity. 
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crowd by about 25 per cent22 and last day’s play had around 44 per cent fewer 
spectators.  
(iv) More subjectively, the “excitement” factors were very important. If the results 
of the Test were obvious, or the state of the series was not in balance, crowds 
were substantially lower. Ceteris paribus, a foregone conclusion on the last 
day, and Australia or England ahead in the series respectively resulted in 
about a 79, 23 and 14 per cent decrease in attendance. Australia or England 
substantially ahead in the match decreased the following day’s crowd by 46 
and 36 per cent respectively.  
(v) Most importantly for our topic, Bradman at the batting crease increased crowd 
size by about 25 per cent, a result significantly different from zero at the 1 per 
cent level. On average, this translates into just over 7,200 people for each day 
on which he batted.  
 
The major result ((v)) can be compared with those derived in both Chapman et al. 
(1987) and Bhattacharya and Smyth (2003). In the former the Bradman effect was found 
to be about 22 per cent, a disparity traceable in the main from the inclusion of Bradman’s 
innings in the 1928 series. The latter research found an almost identical result of around 
23 per cent on average crowd sizes, even though their exercise included many more post-
1969 observations, data on other opponents and somewhat different regression 
specifications. We interpret the strong similarities of these comparative findings as 
indicating that our estimate of the Bradman crowd effect is sensible, because it is so 
clearly robust to these different approaches. 
The third column, showing additional daily revenue (in 2004 terms), by definition 
reflects the crowd size effects, with the major result being that each day in which 
Bradman batted delivered about $57,000. This figure is derived through the use of 
averages, and a more accurate figure using data on individual days is used later in our 
exercise.  
Potentially, several problems remain in the current exercise in interpreting both 
economic relationships and the effect of Bradman. In relation to the former, it is difficult 
to interpret the price results. One reason is that officials might have decreased admittance 
                                                 
22 Not surprisingly, rain (or bad light) interruptions was found to have a significant negative effect on 
crowd size in most studies of cricket attendance. For Australia, Bhattacharya and Smyth (2003) found a 
significant negative effect of about 18 per cent.    
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charges because they perceived a decrease in interest in Test cricket, and in this 
circumstance the estimated price elasticities will be underestimated.  
As far as the Bradman effect is concerned, one caveat warrants noting. Cricket 
officials were aware of his potential to increase crowds, a point evidenced by the 
presence of advertisements to this effect. If such advertisements were effective it follows 
that the Bradman coefficient also reflects the effect of promotional expenditure. In their 
absence the estimated effect of Bradman would be lower, although it is difficult to sustain 
a compelling case that advertising was a major factor. It is not clear that this matters for 
interpretations of the effect of a star on cricket revenues. 
 
5. Interpreting Bradman’s financial contribution to Australian cricket 
The crowd size effects shown in Table 3 can be used to illustrate the effect of Don 
Bradman on cricket revenues. However, the estimate now reported converts the 
percentage increase in the crowd into a daily revenue estimate by adjusting the actual 
crowd on the day, rather than the average as shown in Table 3, by the price of admission 
recorded for that day (in $2004). This gives an average daily revenue increase when 
Bradman was batting of just over $65,000, which translates into a total of just over $2 
million for his post-1930 period of Australian Ashes Tests. 
To this figure we could add estimates of the Bradman externality effect, computed 
through the use of the addition of the BRAD and BSERIES coefficients from Equation 1, 
Table 2. This results in a total Bradman effect of about $2.7 million, but this could be 
argued to be too high since the presumed externality effect coefficient is not statistically 
different from zero. 
These estimates tell only a part of the story of the effect of Bradman on Australian 
cricket. This is because, in a sense, the figures reported could be interpreted as reflecting 
only a change in income for Australian cricket, as if they are lottery winnings spent on 
consumption. However, presumably the additional revenue could be used by cricket 
authorities for investment in infrastructure and other facilities, including coaching and 
promotion.  
Under an investment scenario it might be suggested that cricket authorities 
received an on-going return on the additional finances received by the presence of 
Bradman. To put it differently, the resources could have been used to buy financial assets 
providing annual (compounded) returns, and implicitly this is what is likely to be the case 
with respect to infrastructure investments. It is thus useful to ask: what is Bradman’s 
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2004 value to Australian cricket, under the assumption that the resources were invested in 
the development of cricket at the time of Bradman batting, and received different real 
annual returns. 
It is not clear what the correct real rate of return to assets is, but it would be 
reasonable to suggest that it lies between 1.5 and 4 per cent per annum.23 Table 4 shows 
what the 2004 value of these investments would be under the two rate of return 
assumptions, and for both the individual Bradman effect and the individual Bradman 
effect plus the estimated externality effect. 
These different approaches imply a substantial range in our estimates of the value 
of the Bradman effect, from about $5.5 to $35.4 million. This highlights clearly the very 
significant role played by compound rates of interest. Importantly, if the revenue had 
been used in a way that there has been no return at all, the figure of around $2 million 
might still be the best estimate. 
 
Table 4 
2004 Value of Additional Revenue 
  
Real interest rate of 1.5% per annum 
Total revenue $5,511,255 
Total revenue (with externality effect)* $7,121,279 
Real interest rate of 4% per annum  
Total revenue  $27,362,393 
Total revenue (with externality effect)* $35,355,871 
  
*Based on combined value of BRAD & BSERIES coefficients 
 
On the other hand, our analysis concerns only Ashes Tests played in Australia. 
However, it is very likely that Don Bradman delivered similar returns to the Australian 
Cricket Board for each of the (single) Test series he played in against India, South Africa 
and the West Indies. If the revenue benefits were similar as for Ashes Tests the estimates 
reported above could be approximately doubled. 
 
6. Additional illustrations of the financial value of Bradman 
Don Bradman’s financial value can be expressed in a number of alternative ways. 
One approach is to compare the additional revenue from Bradman with the amount the 
Australian Cricket Board paid him for each series in which he played. This can be 
                                                 
23 Since 1900 the average real interest rate for Australia is around 1.5 per cent, but the long-term real rate of 
return on a diversified investment portfolio is around 4 per cent (Fraser, 1991) 
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thought of as a measure of the financial surplus from Bradman received by the ACB. As 
discussed previously, the ACB, through is control over Test matches and the regulation 
of transfer conditions, is likely to have been able to secure substantial windfall gains from 
players of exceptional talent.  
A way to express the financial surplus from Bradman is in terms of the ratio of 
additional earnings per series to his series fee. The extra revenue from Bradman batting 
per series is based on his estimated overall effect on revenue averaged over all series 
(post 1930).24 This is estimated to be about $694,700 per series (in $2004), with the 
figure for the 1937/38 series being somewhat higher (at around $964,100). We have 
available Bradman’s 1936/37 series fee of around $10,428 (in $2004) and have used this 
as his average series fee.  
Table 5 shows that for all series (excluding Bradman’s first in 1928/29) the ratio 
of extra revenue to Bradman’s presumed average series fee was around 67. To put it in its 
most extreme form, the extra revenue from Bradman was about 6,600 per cent of the 
amount paid to Bradman by the ACB. These two figures are significantly higher for the 
1936/37 series. 
A different way to assess the financial value of Bradman is to compare the 
additional revenue produced by Bradman with that estimated to have been produced by 
an average worker at the time. Two assumptions are made for the purposes of this 
comparison.  
First, since Test series happened about every six months, we argue that a player’s 
contribution represents six month’s of a typical worker’s production. Second, six-month’s 
revenue produced by an average worker is based on a six-month total of male average 
weekly earnings in 1936 (which, from male average weekly earnings is $295 per week in 
2004 dollars). Assuming that the wage of an average worker is equal to their marginal 
revenue product, the data of Table 5 imply that Bradman had around 125 times the 
revenue product of the average worker in 1936, in addition to his contribution as a more 
normal Test cricketer. 
 
                                                 
24 This ignores the possibility that the extra crowd coming to watch Bradman may have incurred some 
additional costs, such as ground staff and rubbish collection, which should be subtracted from the estimated 
revenue. 
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Table 5 
Additional Measures of Bradman’s Financial Value* 
Bradman’s ‘surplus’ to Australian Cricket Board   
  
All Series (post 1930)  
Extra revenue per series/series fee 67 
Extra revenue as percentage of series fee 6,561 per cent 
1936-37 Series  
Extra revenue/series fee 93 
Extra revenue as percentage of series fee  9,145 per cent 
 
Comparison with revenue of average employee 
  
6-months average employee revenue* $7,660 
6-months marginal revenue of Bradman* $964,141 
Ratio of Bradman’s revenue/average revenue 125 
  
*In 2004 dollars  
 
Finally, it is also informative to consider the proportion of total Test revenue 
contributed by Bradman. While the estimated effect on daily crowds from Bradman was 
around 25 per cent, Bradman did not bat on each day. Therefore, his proportionate 
contribution to overall revenue will be less than the estimated effect on crowd size (and 
hence revenue) for the days on which he batted. Figure 2 shows the estimated percentage 
contribution of Bradman to overall revenue for each Test match in which he played.25 
Averaged over all tests (the last column of Figure 2), Bradman contributed around 10 per 
cent to total match revenue for the Tests in which he played.  
 
Figure 2 
Bradman's Revenue As Proportion of Match Total
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
19
32
-2
19
32
-3
19
32
-4
19
32
-5
19
36
-1
19
36
-2
19
36
-3
19
36
-4
19
36
-5
19
46
-1
19
46
-2
19
46
-3
19
46
-4
19
46
-5
All
 Te
sts
Year-Test no. 
%
 o
f r
ev
en
ue
 p
er
 te
st
 
                                                 
25 Bradman did not play in the first Test in 1932. 
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 7. Conclusion 
Don Bradman’s Test batting contributions are legendary, and there is 
considerably anecdotal evidence that his presence at the crease significantly affected 
crowd sizes. Our exercise has confirmed that this is indeed the case; roughly, every day 
on which he batted in an Australian Ashes Test after 1930 the crowd was 25 per cent 
higher than otherwise, and this is controlling for a large number of economic and cricket-
specific variables.  
The equivalent of the Australian Cricket Board controlled all the rules concerning 
player eligibility, with this implying that if there were rents to be gained from the higher 
attendances associated with a super-star, there was no reason to share the higher 
revenues. This implies that Australian cricket was the direct financial beneficiary of 
Bradman’s popularity, and we have been able to use estimates of the crowd increases to 
calculate the additional revenue accruing to the ACB. 
The estimates vary considerably, depending particularly on the assumptions used 
concerning the use to which cricket authorities put their Bradman revenues. If there has 
been no return over time, the benefit was of the order of $65,000 per Bradman batting 
day in 2004 terms, or just over $2 million in total. While this might not seem to be 
extraordinary, it is worth noting that it represents over 10 per cent of all Ashes crowd 
revenues in the 1932-47 period, and is over a hundred times more than our presumption 
of a typical worker’s earnings at the time. 
We have also been able to estimate what the increase in the value of the stock of 
real assets might have been to 2004 for Australian cricket as a result of the additional 
Bradman revenues. At a low return of 1.5 per cent the estimate is around $5.5 million, but 
this rises to a (questionable?) figure of $35 million or so if the return was a high 4 per 
cent per annum. 
Since our focus is limited to the financial implications of Don Bradman, the 
figures reflect just a small aspect of his national contribution. Undoubtedly many will 
argue that his non-economic effects were very considerably higher than even the highest 
estimate reported above. 
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Appendix  
 
 
Ramsey's RESET Tests* 
Linear F(3, 256) =     14.17 
 Prob > F =      0.000 
Log-Linear F(3, 252) =      0.53 
 Prob > F =      0.662 
*test using powers of fitted dependent variable 
 
 
 20
